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█ Abstract In this paper I will try to provide some arguments against a broad definition of “empathy”. 
Firstly, I will deal with attempts to define empathy as an umbrella concept. Then, I will try to point out 
the four main elements which contribute to the confusion that researchers in both the social and political 
as well as the scientific and philosophical domains face when dealing with empathy. In order to resolve 
this confusion, I suggest applying David Marr’s distinction to the field of empathy. Instead of providing 
an umbrella definition for empathy, which tries to account for all the data coming from different disci-
plines, I believe understanding that there are different levels of explanations and that different disciplines 
can contribute to each of them will provide a more detailed and less confused definition of empathy. 
KEYWORDS: Empathy; D. Marr; de Waal; Identification; Helping-behavior; Cost/benefit Analysis. 
 
█ Riassunto Contro una definizione ampia di “empatia” – In questo articolo cercherò di fornire alcuni ar-
gomenti contrari all’adozione di una definizione ampia di “empatia”. In primo luogo cercherò di definire 
la nozione di empatia come una sorta di ombrello concettuale. Proverò poi a indicare i quattro principali 
elementi responsabili delle confusioni di cui gli studiosi cadono vittima sia in ambito sociale e politico sia 
in ambito scientifico e filosofico quando si occupano di empatia. Per sgombrare il campo da questa confu-
sione proporrò di applicare la distinzione avanzata da David Marr al campo dell’empatia. Anziché dare 
una definizione di empatia come una sorta di ombrello concettuale, cercando di tenere insieme tutte le 
evidenze provenienti da discipline diverse, sono convinta che la comprensione del fatto che possono darsi 
livelli differenti di spiegazione e che discipline diverse possano contribuire ognuna per proprio conto alla 
comprensione di questi livelli costituisca la via migliore per raggiungere una definizione di empatia più 
specifica e meno confusa. 







IN RECENT TIMES, THERE HAS been grow-
ing interest concerning the concept of “em-
pathy” in the literature.1 My aim in this paper 
will be to underline the utility of a conceptual 
clarification within this research topic. 
The argument for further distinctions be-
tween different concepts and levels will come 
from the critical analysis of “empathy” as a 
broad concept.2 These accounts – aside from 
relevant differences – all rely on the possibil-
ity of conceiving of “empathy” as a super-
ordinate category that includes different pro-
cesses or components. Through my critical 
analysis, I will advocate the need for a clear 
distinction between related concepts. Karsten 
Stueber correctly noted in his overview of em-
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As psychologists themselves have become 
increasingly aware, the empirical investi-
gation of empathy has been hindered 
(particularly in the beginning) by concep-
tual confusions and a multiplicity of defi-
nitions of the empathy concept […] With-
in social psychology, this state of affairs is 
due to the fact that the empathy concept 
merged with and completely replaced the 
multi-dimensional concept of sympathy 
used by earlier psychologists and philoso-
phers.3 
 
I will also argue that much of the criticism 
that has been directed at empathy is due to 
this conceptual confusion and can be avoided 
by making a further distinction. I will use 
Paul Bloom’s article Against Empathy.4 as an 
example that illustrates this. I believe what 
divides Paul Bloom’s position – and that of 
some of his commentators – from my own is 
a matter of definition. 
 
█ Criticism of Preston and de Waal’s ac-
count of “Empathy” 
 
Let me start by outlining four main criti-
cisms of Preston and de Waal’s account 
which I take to be an example of a broad 
view on “empathy”. In what follows, I will fo-
cus solely on those aspects of the paper that I 
wish to critique. 
The first two criticisms deal with the au-
thors’ intention to distinguish only between 
proximate and ultimate causes of behavior.5 
In the explanation the authors give about the 
specific causes of empathy,6 it is hard to dis-
tinguish theories from data. In this respect, it 
is useful to consider Marr’s distinction be-
tween different levels of explanation.7 To 
consider this distinction is not to say that 
proximate and ultimate causes do not matter, 
but just to suggest that a further differentia-
tion between the level of computational the-
ory, the algorithmic or representational level, 
and that of implementation might be useful 
in disentangling different aspects of empa-
thy. As the authors themselves claim: 
 
The authors view the term empathy 
broadly, similar to Hoffman, as: any pro-
cess where the attended perception of the 
object’s state generates a state in the subject 
that is more applicable to the object’s state 
or situation than to the subject’s own prior 
state or situation […] A process model 
makes empathy a superordinate category 
that includes all subclasses of phenomena 
that share the same mechanism.8 
 
The subclasses of phenomena the authors 
have in mind are represented in their Figure 
1 and include: identification, emotional con-
tagion, “true empathy”, cognitive empathy, 
helping behavior, and guilt.9 Moreover, in a 
previous version of the paper, the same fig-
ure included: identification, emotional con-
tagion, “true empathy”, cognitive empathy, 
perspective taking, and theory of mind.10 
As Hinde correctly notes, in his commen-
tary on Preston and de Waal’s article, the aim 
of integrating different phenomena in order 
to provide a unified explanation is definitely 
a relevant one, but the way in which the au-
thors attempt to do it lacks precision and ex-
planatory power:  
 
Definitional clarity is not enhanced by the 
juxtaposition of distinct levels of dis-
course.11  
 
Going back to the necessity of a further 
distinction between levels of explanation, in-
stances such as the following can be found in 
the paper: 
 
A Perception-Action Model of empathy 
specifically states that attended perception 
of the object’s state automatically activates 
the subject’s representations of the state, 
situation, and object, and that activation of 
these representations automatically primes 
or generates the associated automatic and 




What might be observed in instances such 
as the latter is the fact that the authors pro-
vide an interpretation of data coming from 
ethology, developmental psychology, and 
neuro-imaging studies that – though plausi-
ble – is not the only explanation possible. It is 
somehow taken for granted that certain data 
support a specific theoretical perspective 
without a deeper understanding of other pos-
sible interpretations. In the relation between 
theoretical accounts and data this is a com-
mon, yet dangerous, error. It might give the 
reader the impression that a specific set of 
data is the ultimate proof for a specific theo-
ry. In this respect, philosophical analysis can 
prove extremely useful. 
The Perception-Action Model (PAM), as 
the authors themselves claim, is a theoretical 
framework that claims that a certain state of 
the object automatically activates a certain 
set of representations, which themselves ac-
tivate, again automatically, certain somatic 
responses. It is clear that in the passage I just 
quoted the authors shift from a theoretical 
level to a representational one and, moreo-
ver, to an implementational one without any 
explanation for these moves. As I mentioned, 
I believe understanding that there are three 
different, yet connected, levels of explanation 
might be useful in better understanding the 
phenomenon of empathy. It is one thing to 
propose a theoretical account, such as PAM, 
and another to claim that in an empathic 
phenomenon certain representations are ac-
tivated. Moreover, how these representations 
are implemented is yet another thing. 
Obviously the concept of representation 
is itself particularly problematic. Moreover it 
is hard to understand – as Martin Hoffman 
noticed in his Commentary to Preston and de 
Waal’s paper13 – how it could be the case that 
the process the authors describe would be 
useful for all of the different phenomena that 
they conceive as part of the concept of empa-
thy. Namely, it is hard to figure out how an 
explanation that refers to representations of 
states, situations, and objects can be ascribed 
to identification and emotional contagion as 
primary experiences of empathy that even 
infants can have. The response provided by 
the authors claims that their usage of “repre-
sentation”: 
 
refer[s] to the neuronal connections of 
the brain that store the information. As 
such, muscle movements, feeling states, 
associations, conditioning, and so on, are 
all mediated by representations, and they 
require no special cognitive abilities be-
yond the plasticity that exists in any cen-
tral nervous system.14 
 
Though this explanation somehow ac-
commodates Hoffman’s objection as far as 
basic forms of emotional sharing are con-
cerned, it cannot accommodate the presence 
of different levels of explanation being dis-
played as a continuum. Neither does it allow 
for more complex phenomena for which we 
think that more than simply plasticity is 
needed to be classified as cognitive empathy. 
Again, it seems difficult to provide a uni-
fied explanation that can account for all of the 
phenomena Preston and de Waal want to ex-
plain. Furthermore, in Preston and de Waal’s 
work, there is not only in the problem of dis-
tinguishing between the theoretical, the repre-
sentational, and the implementational levels, 
but there are also unjustified moves from the 
mechanisms we are endowed with – obviously 
neutral – to a specific and desirable behavior. 
Thus nervous systems that respond au-
tomatically with empathy to situations where 
they must respond.15 The risk that this kind 
of assertion poses is that of a hard naturaliza-
tion of moral behavior, according to which, 
provided there is a certain mechanism we are 
endowed with, it can be directly derived that 
a certain behavior will be displayed. Obvi-
ously, the authors do not advocate such a 
strong view, but there is a risk of over-
interpreting the data. Both these criticisms 
can be avoided by means of a further distinc-
tion between levels of explanation and the 
difference between moral psychology – in-
terpreted as providing us a description of the 
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basic mechanisms that support moral judg-
ment and the direction of one’s behavior – 
and moral behavior itself. 
The core idea is that the reason why we 
should care about the data concerning our 
basic capacities when doing moral philosophy 
is to try and identify what is morally possible 
for beings such as we are. In order to prescribe 
a behavior, we need to know that a specific 
kind of response to what happens to us can be 
displayed by the kind of individuals we are. 
The other two criticisms to Preston and 
de Waal’s account concern specifically the 
idea that the better way to understand empa-
thy and all the literature on it is to provide a 
“unified whole”.16 In a more recent paper, 
Frans de Waal17 suggests a more plausible re-
interpretation of the relations between all of 
the phenomena that seem to be conceived as 
subsets of the concept of empathy in his paper 
with Preston. The Russian Doll Model18 claims 
that:  
 
higher cognitive levels of empathy [are] 
built upon a firm, hard-wired basis, such as 
PAM.19 
 
Besides the more plausible explanation 
that the Russian Doll Model entails, two main 
difficulties remain. On the one hand, it is as-
sumed that the PAM represents the basic 
form of empathy, without any further discus-
sion of possible alternative interpretations; on 
the other – more relevantly – de Waal suggest 
that all of the phenomena constituting the 
outer layers of the doll share the same core 
mechanisms with basic forms of empathy. 
In order to show that it is not necessary 
for these phenomena to share the same 
mechanisms, let me briefly analyze the rela-
tion between “true empathy” and helping be-
havior. I will do this firstly by looking at the 
explanation Preston and de Waal propose in 
their article for such a link and, afterwards, 
by underlining the difference between the 
two levels of the description. In Preston and 
de Waal’s article, there are two possible in-
terpretations of the connection between em-
pathy and helping behavior. On the one 
hand, given the examples the authors pro-
vide, it looks like the fact that rats, monkeys 
and infants are able to display a certain be-
havior constitutes evidence for their ability 
to empathize. In particular: 
 
In an experiment with rhesus monkeys, 
subjects were trained to pull two chains 
that delivered different amounts of food. 
The experimenters then altered the situa-
tion so that pulling the chain with the larg-
er reward caused a monkey in sight of the 
subject to be shocked. After the subjects 
witnessed the shock of the conspecific, 
two-thirds preferred the nonshock chain 
even though it resulted in half as many re-
wards. Of the remaining third, one 
stopped pulling the chains altogether for 5 
days and another for 12 days after witness-
ing the shock of the object. These monkeys 
were literally starving themselves to pre-
vent the shock to the conspecific.20 
 
The authors refer to the experiment con-
ducted by Masserman et al.21 To construe 
empathy as a broad phenomenon does not 
sufficiently underline the difference between 
“feeling the state of another” and performing 
a helping or pro-social behavior because of 
that feeling. These are two different, though 
connected, phenomena. It is one thing to un-
derscore the connection between empathy 
and pro-social behavior; it is quite another to 
consider the latter as part of the concept of 
the former itself.  
These examples, all from empirical re-
ports, show that individuals of many species 
are distressed by the distress of a conspecific 
and will act to terminate the object’s distress, 
even incurring risk to themselves.22 
The experiments are taken to be the proof 
of a direct and pre-reflective link between 
empathy and helping behavior. On the other 
hand, researchers try to emphasize that pro-
social behavior is the result of a complex 
cost/benefit analysis and it is not obviously a 






it may be more accurate to consider help-
ing behavior as the result of a complex 
cost/benefit analysis on the perceived ef-
fectiveness of helping and the effect of 
helping on short and long-term goals.23 
 
It is not clear how the two definitions of the 
relation between empathy and helping behav-
ior can be integrated. If the examples prove a 
point and they are actually evidence of empa-
thy, then the link between empathy and help-
ing behavior seems to be direct and it is not 
clear why we should concede that the latter has 
having to do with a cost/benefit analysis. 
Obviously, the difficulty, if this version of 
the connection is the correct one, arises when 
we confront ourselves with occurrences in 
which we believe there is an empathic re-
sponse but no helping behavior follows. 
Again, according to this version, the risk is 
that of a hard naturalization: provided we 
have a certain mechanism, we will act in a 
certain – pro-social or moral – way upon it. 
The question as to why we sometimes do not 
respond by helping others then becomes a 
real issue. If, on the other hand, it is true that 
helping behavior is a more complex phenom-
enon involving a cost/benefit analysis, then it 
is not clear why it should be counted within 
the scope of the concept of empathy itself. 
Moreover, the authors continue to shift 
from one definition to the other. If the exam-
ples were not meant to be considered as evi-
dence, despite the explicit reference to them as 
that kind of evidence, and the idea that helping 
behavior is a cost/benefit analysis was to be 
considered as the proper definition they want-
ed to put forward, it is not easy to understand 
how they can state the following thesis: 
 
A process model makes empathy a super-
ordinate category that includes all sub-
classes of phenomena that share the same 
mechanism.24  
 
If the cost/benefit analysis is conceived as 
a conscious one, data from fMRI studies sug-
gest that the mechanisms underlining it are 
different from those at the basis of emotional 
responses.25 
A possible solution for this apparent con-
tradiction is that of understanding the 
cost/benefit analysis as an unconscious mecha-
nism.26 This interpretation might well explain 
basic forms of helping behavior, such as those 
shown by infants or primates, but it will not ac-
count for more complex and more cognitively 
loaded forms of helping behavior. A few exam-
ples may clarify my argument against the idea 
of helping behavior deriving from an uncon-
scious cost/benefit analysis. On the one hand, 
there are cases in which individuals are com-
pletely other-oriented in their behavioral 
choices. These are obviously instances of su-
pererogative behavior, but it is complicated to 
understand them as deriving from an appropri-
ate cost/benefit analysis. 
In particular, if helping behavior depends 
on a cost/benefit analysis, supererogative be-
havior cannot constitute the higher level of 
moral behavior, but rather a misdirected analy-
sis that disregards risks to the first person in 
balancing costs and benefits. If John incurs a 
risk to his own life in order to save a stranger, it 
might well be the case that he is doing so out of 
altruism instead of because of a cost/benefit 
analysis. On the other, if the mechanism is un-
conscious, how can we account for occurrences 
of conscious cost/benefit analysis before be-
having? How is it possible that for more basic 
forms of empathy the cost/benefit analysis is 
unconscious, while for those that are more 
complex we need to be informed of such an 
analysis? 
We have all experienced occasions in 
which we were strongly considering whether 
to help someone or not based on the out-
comes – both for ourselves and others – of 
such a helping behavior. So that, from expe-
rience, we can easily see that – at least some-
times – helping behavior requires a great deal 
of conscious analysis. 
Again, the problem with these cases re-
lates to the different levels that they account 
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for. From a specific behavior, we cannot 
straightforwardly derive which mechanism 
underlies it. Behavioral responses are not suf-
ficient even to identify and distinguish dif-
ferent forms of emotional experience, let 
alone empathic occurrences: from behavioral 
data we cannot infer that an empathic epi-
sode is going on, there might well be many 
other relevant causes of the behavior. 
There is also another difficulty in this 
connection between empathy and helping 
behavior: how can it account for occurrences 
in which we help for reasons other than emo-
tional arousal? John can help Max because he 
sees him in distress and he wants to help him 
alleviate that feeling, or because he feels an 
obligation or a duty to do so, or because he 
believes Max will then feel an obligation to 
reciprocate, or because helping him will serve 
some other interest or goal John has. Helping 
behavior per se does not necessarily need to 
be linked with empathy or with an under-
standing of others’ emotions. 
The attempt to connect empathy with 
helping or pro-social behavior, though rele-
vant, cannot be conducted in such a direct and 
straightforward way: it gives the misleading 
idea that we can move directly from a descrip-
tion of a mechanism to its behavioral conse-
quences as if those were univocal, caused only 
by the former, and non-controversial. Helping 
behavior can be the consequence of so many 
different mechanisms at work that to rely 
simply on its connection to empathy would be 
reductive. I believe the more feasible way to 
connect helping behavior and empathy is to 
derive the former, at least in some relevant 
case, from a specific moral character to be 
built based on sympathy rather than on empa-
thy as a basic mechanism. The connection be-
tween empathy and sympathy cannot be ana-
lyzed here. 
This is not to say that there is no relation 
at all between the phenomena Preston and de 
Waal describe as constituting the domain of 
empathy – i.e. identification, emotional con-
tagion, “true empathy”, cognitive empathy, 
helping behavior, and guilt – but just to sug-
gest that distinguishing between these phe-
nomena can provide a more accurate account 
of all of them, of their mechanisms, and their 
relations. To say that there is continuity of 
these phenomena – as Preston and de Waal 
claim – does not necessarily mean that they 
have to be interpreted as being the same 
thing. 
Moreover, it seems that the idea that all 
these phenomena fall under the same concep-
tual framework depends on the acceptance of 
a Perception-Action Model (PAM). So that, if 
PAM falls, there is no reason to believe that 
the rest of the theoretical framework should 
hold. I cannot deal with this objection here, 
but it would constitute an important way to 
dismiss this account. 
 
█ Other Broad Concepts of “Empathy” 
 
The latter kind of criticism directed to 
Preston and de Waal’s work can also explain 
the skepticism for other broad conceptions 
of empathy. Just to provide a few examples of 
the kind of definitions I am referring to, let 
me mention the definitions provided by 
Simone Shamay-Tsoory, Daniel Batson, and 
Simon Baron-Cohen. 
 
Empathy is a broad concept that refers 
to the cognitive as well as the emotional 
reactions of one individual to the ob-
served experiences of another […] Emo-
tional empathy may involve several relat-
ed underlying processes, including, among 
others, emotional contagion, emotion 
recognition, and shared pain. On the oth-
er hand […] the term cognitive empathy 
describes empathy as a cognitive role-
taking ability, or the capacity to engage in 
the cognitive process of adopting anoth-
er’s psychological point of view. This abil-
ity may involve making inferences regard-
ing the other’s affective and cognitive 
mental states […] It seems likely that each 
component in the empathy network is as-
sociated with distinct functions that com-




characterize the empathy network, it is 
necessary to identify the roles of each 
contributing brain region to the processes 
that support the 2 systems.27 
 
In this passage, the author correctly dis-
tinguishes two different systems and pro-
vides evidence for their different basic mech-
anisms and processes. Notwithstanding this 
distinction, though, she conceives these two 
distinct systems as pertaining to the domain 
of the same concept – namely “empathy”.28 
In Altruism in Humans Daniel Batson 
provides a very interesting and appealing 
definition of the relation between empathy 
and altruism. The definitions provided are 
extremely well-informed and the conceptual 
distinction is carried out carefully. Yet, when 
it comes to defining “empathy”, the defini-
tion goes as follows: 
 
I shall use the term empathic emotion to 
refer to other-oriented emotions elicited 
by and congruent with the perceived wel-
fare of someone else. I shall use empathic 
concern and, as a shorthand, empathy to 
refer to other-oriented emotion elicited by 
and congruent with the perceived welfare of 
someone in need […] as defined, empathic 
concern is not a single, discrete emotion 
but includes a whole constellation. It in-
cludes feelings of sympathy, compassion, 
softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow, sad-
ness, upset, distress, concern, and grief.29 
 
So, besides the extremely relevant differ-
entiation Batson displays between different 
phenomena that have been understood as in-
ternal to empathy itself, his definition re-
mains too broad, since it includes feelings of 
sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, ten-
derness, sorrow, sadness, upset, distress, con-
cern, and grief. The last example refers to 
Simon Baron-Cohen’s definition of “empa-
thy”: 
 
Empathy occurs when we suspend our sin-
gle-minded focus of attention and instead 
adopt a double-minded focus of attention. 
[…] When empathy is switched off, we 
think only about our own interests. When 
empathy is switched on, we focus on other 
people’s interests too […] So we can ex-
tend the definition of empathy as follows: 
Empathy is our ability to identify what 
someone else is thinking or feeling and to re-
spond to their thoughts and feelings with an 
appropriate emotion. This suggests there 
are at least two stages in empathy: recog-
nition and response. Both are needed.30 
 
Baron-Cohen’s definition is obviously a 
very broad one containing both a recognition 
element – for thoughts as well as feelings – 
and an appropriate emotional response. 
However, it is one thing to recognize some-
one else’ emotional state, and another to rec-
ognize her thoughts, and a very different one 
to respond appropriately to either of them. 
Moreover, Baron-Cohen derives from this 
extremely appealing account a straightfor-
ward conclusion:  
 
The key idea is that we all lie somewhere 
on an empathy spectrum (from high to 
low). People said to be evil or cruel are 
simply at one extreme of the empathy 
spectrum.31 
 
This approach resembles the idea I have 
analyzed in Preston and de Waal’s article of a 
connection between empathy and helping 
behavior. The only difference is that while 
their focus was on specific behaviors, Baron-
Cohen’s focus is on the whole character of a 
person. So that if someone is said to be a cru-
el person, this is due to the fact that he has no 
empathy. These cases are what the author de-
fines as the «zero degrees of empathy»,32 to 
which many of his works are devoted.  
The similarity between this derivation of 
cruelty from a lack of empathy and the connec-
tion shown by Preston and de Waal between 
empathy and helping behavior exposes Baron-
Cohen’s account to the same kind of criticisms 
I have made of Preston and de Waal’s work. 
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█ Paul Bloom’s “Against Empathy” 
 
A deeper criticism of Baron-Cohen’s ac-
count comes from Paul Bloom: 
 
Strong inclination toward empathy comes 
with costs. Individuals scoring high in 
unmitigated communion report asym-
metrical relationships, where they support 
others but don’t get support themselves. 
They also are more prone to suffer de-
pression and anxiety. Working from a dif-
ferent literature on “pathological altru-
ism,” Barbara Oakley notes in Cold-
Blooded Kindness, ‘It’s surprising how 
many diseases and syndromes commonly 
seen in women seem to be related to 
women’s generally stronger empathy for 
and focus on others.’ The problems that 
arise here have to do with emotional em-
pathy – feeling another’s pain. This leads 
to what psychologists call empathetic dis-
tress. We can contrast this with non-
empathetic compassion – a more dis-
tanced love and kindness and concern for 
others. Such compassion is a psychologi-
cal plus. Putting aside the obvious point 
that some degree of caring for others is 
morally right, kindness and altruism are 
associated with all sorts of positive physi-
cal and psychological outcomes, including 
a boost in both short-term mood and 
long-term happiness. If you want to get 
happy, helping others is an excellent way 
to do so. It is worth expanding on the dif-
ference between empathy and compas-
sion, because some of empathy’s biggest 
fans are confused on this point and think 
that the only force that can motivate 
kindness is empathetic arousal. But this is 
mistaken.33 
 
I believe Paul Bloom’s influential article 
Against Empathy, which appeared in the Bos-
ton Review, can be interpreted as criticizing a 
broad account of empathy in which the latter 
is seen as the “moral good” and as “the only 
force that motivates kindness”. The criticism 
is somehow directed towards an even broad-
er target, than the one that can be found in 
Preston and de Waal, Shamay-Tsoory, and 
Batson’s works: it refers specifically to empa-
thy’s role in social justice and moral behavior. 
It is easy to see, then, how empathy can be a 
moral good, and it has many champions. 
Obama talks frequently about empathy; wit-
ness his recent claim, after his first meeting 
with Pope Francis, that ‘it’s the lack of empa-
thy that makes it very easy for us to plunge 
into wars. It’s the lack of empathy that allows 
us to ignore the homeless on the streets.’34 
 
In line with the criticism I have put for-
ward, problems arise when we imply that 
to act in a good way, or to be helpful, is 
and can only be due to empathy. There is, 
though, a difference between Bloom’s 
criticism and my own. His target is the 
way in which the term empathy is com-
monly used in social and political debates, 
while mine is the way in which empathy is 
portrayed in the scientific and philosoph-
ical domains. Besides this difference in 
the target, a relation can be traced out be-
tween the two domains. 
 
On the one hand, data coming from sci-
entific research underscorelining the relation 
between empathy and helping behavior have 
been interpreted as a thorough explanation 
of the link, giving the  impression to the 
nonprofessional audience that the matter is 
settled and we know everything that is rele-
vant for a helping behavior to occur. Refer-
ences to empathy in the social or political de-
bate are often driven by this intuition: since 
empathy has been proven to be a good can-
didate for helping and morally good behav-
ior, then to pursue a more empathic world is 
to pursue a more just and fair world. Unfor-
tunately, things are not so easily assessed. 
Paul Bloom’s criticisms of this simplistic 
viewpoint are well directed. For a society to 
be just and fair we need much more than 
empathy itself and it is true that empathy has 




the intuition rests on the assumption that 
from scientific data we can straightforwardly 
derive what is morally good or wrong. How-
ever, the matter is much more complicated, 
so that such an assumption is both wrong 
and dangerous. 
On the other hand, the common sense us-
age of the term has certainly influenced those 
researchers who have considered it more 
promising to conceive of “empathy” as a 
broad concept, so that it would be applicable 
to all of the common sense uses. However, 
the difference – that I believe has been ne-
glected – is between the extension of the 
term “empathy” to its related phenomena – 
such as identification, emotional contagion – 
and the derivation of moral behavior, moral-
ly good consequences from empathy. The 
former is true in many scientific and philo-
sophical works,35 the latter is more akin to 
common sense usage. While the difference 
remains, even though heavily disregarded in 
the literature, these misconceptions bear re-
ciprocal influences. 
 
█ Some elements in favor of conceptual 
clarification 
 
For the purposes of this paper it will be 
enough to have shown some difficulties in 
accounts – that offered by Preston and de 
Waal has been used as the major example – 
that deny the necessity of a conceptual clari-
fication within this field. If we conflate au-
tomatic neural responses and behaviors un-
der the same broad concept, it will be non-
rhetorical to ask why and how things can go 
wrong. Non-helping behaviors need a more 
accurate explanation. If the link is direct, 
how is it possible that sometimes it does not 
work out? 
In general, the relation between empirical 
data and philosophical insight is more com-
plex than just superimposing a model or a 
theoretical framework on data, or interpret-
ing the latter as providing evidence for one 
particular theoretical framework. Moreover, 
I have mentioned that the influence of com-
mon sense usage on scientific research, as 
much as that of an oversimplification of sci-
entific data on the social and political do-
main, can be damaging for both sides. As 
Daniel Batson says in regard to altruism, alt-
hough his insight can certainly be applied to 
empathy itself: 
 
Altruism is not an easy topic; there are 
many conceptual subtleties, inferential 
complexities, and empirical challenges 
that cannot be usefully addressed by over-
simplification.36 
 
I would like here to summarize the rea-
sons for the conceptual confusion, that have 
emerged above, and to provide an idea as to 
how such confusion can be addressed. Four 
main aspects have been emphasized. 
First, as it has been mentioned in discuss-
ing Paul Bloom’s article, the relation between 
empirical research – as it is portrayed for the 
general public – and the common sense usage 
of the term “empathy” has caused several 
problems for attempts to provide a clear and 
precise definition of the subject matter. 
Second, the linguistic issue cannot be ig-
nored. When dealing with conceptual defini-
tions and speakers’ competence in using a 
specific term, we cannot disregard the fact 
that there might be significant differences in 
different languages. I will not look closely in-
to this issue here, but it would be of extreme 
interest to pursue the GRID Project37 – or 
something analogous – for “empathy”, “sym-
pathy” and other related phenomena in order 
to see whether speakers competencies with 
these terms vary across cultures and whether 
a more detailed distinction entails differences 
in experiencing the very same situations. 
To provide an example of the need to 
have specific words in one’s own vocabulary 
in order to be able to understand and apply 
certain conceptual differences, I will consider 
Adam Smith’s usage of the term “sympathy”. 
I believe “sympathy” is used, in Adam 
Smith’s work, in two very different ways, 
even though the fact that he possessed only 
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one word in English complicates the whole 
issue. On the one hand, passages like the fol-
lowing can be found:  
 
When we see a stroke aimed and just 
ready to fall upon the leg or arm of anoth-
er person, we naturally shrink and draw 
back our own leg or our own arm.38  
 
Yet, on the other hand, Smith most of the 
times seems to suggest a more robust sense of 
“sympathy”: 
 
Though our brother is upon the rack, as 
long as we ourselves are at our ease, our 
senses will never inform us of what he suf-
fers. They never did, and never can, carry 
us beyond our own person, and it is by the 
imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations. 
Neither can that faculty help us to this 
any other way, than by representing to us 
what would be our own, if we were in his 
case. It is the impressions of our own 
senses only, not those of his, which our 
imagination copy. By the imagination we 
place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, 
we enter as it were into his body, and be-
come in some measure the same person 
with him, and thence form some idea of 
his sensations, and even feel something 
which, though weaker in degree, is not al-
together unlike them.39 
 
It looks like there are two different phe-
nomena Adam Smith is talking about: on the 
one hand, there is a sort of instinctive ability 
to share, to feel together with others; on the 
other, sympathy seems to arise from imagi-
nation and from our ability to imagine what 
would happen, how we would feel if we were 
that other person. My claim is that these are 
two very different phenomena, the former is 
an ability we are somehow and to some ex-
tent endowed with, it is immediate and unre-
flexive; while the latter is a more complex 
ability to understand others, it requires an ac-
tive engagement of the perceiver in order to 
access it, and the involvement of imagina-
tion.40 The former is a form of sharing, the 
latter a form of comprehension on the basis of 
which we judge others’ actions and emotional 
reactions to be appropriate or not. 
Moreover, I claim that the former makes 
it easier to achieve the latter, but it is not 
necessary to go from the ability to share to 
that of understanding. Cases of impairment 
or reduced ability to share should support 
this claim, in contrast with Simon Baron-
Cohen’s account. I cannot go into this issue 
more deeply here. But why is it that Adam 
Smith used the word “sympathy” for both 
these phenomena? It might be the case that 
he had a broad and comprehensive concept 
of it, as those analyzed in the previous para-
graphs, yet I think the linguistic issue should 
not be ignored. 
 
“Empathy” is the more recent term in 
English, entering the vocabulary only in 
the last century. The credit for translation 
into English goes to Edward Bradford 
Titchener, who coined the word empathy 
to express the difference between Einfüh-
lung (in-feeling) and Mitgefühlung (with-
feeling) […] which was already in the Eng-
lish lexicon as sympathy.41 
 
The fact that the word “empathy” was in-
troduced later than “sympathy” in English 
can help in the interpretation of Adam Smith 
apparent confusion. I used Adam Smith here 
only as an example of what can happen when 
we do not possess sufficient terms and their 
appropriate diversification. 
Third, another reason for the confusion 
relates to the fact that these phenomena have 
been studied from various perspectives. As 
Coplan and Goldie also noticed42 there are 
several research fields in which empathy has 
become relevant. Moreover, it has been used 
for very different purposes. Three main pur-
poses can be identified in the literature. 
First, it has been used to «gain a grasp of 




predict and explain what they will think, feel, 
and do».43 
To this extent, the understanding of em-
pathy relates to the discussion about how we 
understand others, in particular our posses-
sion of such an ability has been interpreted as 
providing evidence for a Simulation Theory 
of how we engage with the content of others’ 
minds or as an alternative view both to Simu-
lation Theory and Theory of Mind (ToM). 
Secondly, empathy has been used to un-
derstand our moral behavior as evidence for 
the revival of sentimentalism and an ethics of 
care, as opposed to a more detached ap-
proach to ethics.44 
Finally, another research field in which 
the concept of empathy has been extensively 
used is the interpretation of our engagement 
with art and works of art. 
The problem with these different uses of 
the term is that when trying to provide a 
comprehensive account of empathy, one has 
to deal with definitions that are rich in theo-
retical assumptions depending on the specific 
role that these traditions want to underline. 
This is possibly one reason why providing a 
definition of empathy that is an umbrella 
concept seems a viable option. Though, as I 
have shown in criticizing such accounts, I be-
lieve to do so is not the most useful way to 
advance our understanding of the ability to 
empathize. 
The concept of empathy has been used to 
consider a broad range of theoretical ques-
tions, from diverse perspectives in numerous 
disciplines. Different aims, different meth-
odologies, and the difficulty in understand-
ing each other’s jargon contribute to contro-
versies in defining the topic. The term empa-
thy has been used for decades – in some cases 
even centuries – in developmental and social 
psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, educa-
tional research, social sciences, philosophy, 
health studies, nursing, ethology, literature, 
and economics just to mention a number of 
fields. To accommodate all of these perspec-
tives is definitely a complex matter. One way 
to do it is to understand to which level each 
one can contribute. It is to this extent that 
Marr’s distinction proves itself extremely 
useful, also in respect to understanding of 
empathy and it constitutes the last aspect I 
believe is worth mentioning. 
David Marr provides an influential de-
scription of how we can account for vision, 
introducing three levels of explanation that 
can and have been used also for other do-
mains. Firstly, he noticed that «almost never 
can a complex system of any kind be under-
stood as a simple extrapolation from the 
properties of its elementary components».45 
The same can be said for empathy: under-
standing the basic processes that enable it – 
e.g. explaining how human brains implement 
empathy – is not sufficient to account for the 
aims we are most interested in. The collec-
tion of functional data – though relevant to 
understand implementation – does not tell us 
anything about the “macroscopic” issues we 
aimed to explain. They do not provide evi-
dence for empathy’s role in ethics or in our 
comprehension of other’s minds.  
 
If one hopes to achieve a full understand-
ing of a system as complicated as a nerv-
ous system […] then one must be prepared 
to contemplate different kinds of explana-
tion at different levels of description that 
are linked, at least in principle, into a co-
hesive whole, even if linking the levels in 
complete detail is impractical.46 
 
The different levels of explanation Marr 
has in mind are: computational theory, rep-
resentation or algorithm, and implementa-
tion. In order to introduce them, he uses the 
example of a cash register. The first and 
more abstract level of explanation is that of a 
computational theory, and the aim is that of 
understanding what the device does and why. 
Following Marr’s example, the cash register 
sums. The what-question is answered by a 
theory of addition. The why-question is an-
swered by considering the reason for choos-
ing that particular operation – addition – in-
stead of other possible options. It is answered 
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by a series of constraints. 
 
In order that a process shall actually run, 
however, one has to realize it in some way 
and therefore choose a representation for 
the entities that the process manipulates. 
The second level of the analysis of a pro-
cess, therefore, involves choosing two 
things: (1) a representation for the input 
and for the output of the process and (2) 
an algorithm by which the transformation 
may actually be accomplished. For addi-
tion, of course, the input and output rep-
resentations can both be the same, be-
cause they both consist of numbers […] If 
the first of our levels specifies what and 
why, this second level specifies how. For 
addition, we might choose Arabic numer-
als for the representations, and for the al-
gorithm we could follow the usual rules 
about adding the least significant digits 
first and “carrying” if the sum exceeds 9. 
Cash registers, whether mechanical or 
electronic, usually use this type of repre-
sentation and algorithm.47 
 
The last level is represented by the im-
plementation, in the case of the cash register 
it is the specific machine that physically em-
bodies the algorithm. As Marr underlines, the 
algorithm that a child uses to add two num-
bers might well be the same used by the cash 
register, but obviously the implementation is 
rather different. Some devices might be more 
apt for certain algorithms. Thus, when de-
signing a program, it might well be that the 
choice of either the implementation we want 
to use or the algorithm that best suits our 
purposes commits us to certain choices at the 
other level. 
This, obviously, holds only when the aim 
is that of creating a device and not when the 
aim is that of explaining an existing device 
that was not produced by us – as in the case 
of both vision and empathy. The Table 1 (see 
below) summarizes the questions to which 
each level has to provide an answer.  
Once a distinction between different ex-
planatory levels has been proposed, though, a 
question concerning the relations between 
them might arise. Marr explains how he be-
lieves the three levels relate to each other as 
follows: 
 
there is a wide choice available at each 
level, and the explication of each level in-
volves issues that are rather independent 
of the other two. Each of the three levels 
of description will have its place in the 
eventual understanding of perceptual in-
formation processing, and of course they 
are logically and causally related. But an 
important point to note is that since the 
three levels are only rather loosely related, 
some phenomena may be explained at on-
ly one or two of them. This means, for ex-
ample, that a correct explanation of some 
psychophysical observation must be for-
Table 1. Reproduction of Marr’s Figures 1-4 (see D.C. MARR, Vision, cit., p. 25). 
 
Computational theory Representation and algorithm Hardware implementation 
 
What is the goal of the compu-
tation, why is it appropriate, 
and what is the logic of the 
strategy by which it can be car-
ried out? 
 
How can this computational 
theory be implemented? In par-
ticular, what is the representa-
tion for the input and output, 




How can the representation 






mulated at the appropriate level. In at-
tempts to relate psychophysical problems 
to physiology, too often there is confusion 
about the level at which problems should 
be addressed.48 
 
The three levels are logically and causally 
related – as mentioned above, when design-
ing a device some constraints from the im-
plementational level might guide the choice 
for a certain algorithm to be implemented, or 
it might be the other way around – yet, they 
are to some extent independent from one an-
other. One can advocate a computational 
theory of vision without entering details 
about how it is represented or implemented. 
The kind of confusion Marr individuates 
in his example is the same one I have tried to 
show when criticizing Preston and De Waal’s 
article. Saying that there is such a confusion 
between different levels of explanation does 
not mean that there can be no relation be-
tween them, but recommends a better under-
standing of the possible contribution of each 
level to a comprehensive analysis of the phe-
nomenon at issue. 
Bearing Marr’s distinction in mind and try-
ing to apply it to the debate about empathy, 
different disciplines can contribute to different 
explanatory levels. Simplifying for the sake of 
understanding, one can say that neuroscientific 
data, for instance, will provide an account of 
the implementational level, of how our brains 
are wired in order for empathy to occur; psy-
chology, broadly speaking, will provide evi-
dence for the representational level; and phi-
losophy will provide the computational frame-
work to understand such a phenomenon. 
In conclusion, given the growing interest 
in empathy in various research fields, some 
departmentalization is still occurring. This 
makes it hard to provide a comprehensive 
view of “empathy” and a shared definition. I 
have analyzed attempts to overcome this 
problematic division. I have considered at-
tempts that I do not think are promising. In 
order to account for empathy given the dif-
ferent data coming from different fields, the-
se theoretical approaches have provided an 
umbrella definition for empathy. I have ar-
gued that this is not the most useful way to 
keep all of the perspectives together. While 
the aim of these research programs is lauda-
ble, since they aim at providing a compre-
hensive explanation of empathy, the solution 
they provide is not convincing. 
The growth of a debate often not only 
brings attention to the topic, but also entails 
some misconceptions and oversimplifications. 
That is what I believe has happened to empa-
thy. For this reason, I dealt with both the com-
mon sense usage of empathy and the different 
uses in specific literatures. Moreover, I suggest-
ed that Marr’s distinction of three levels of ex-
planation is applicable to empathy and offers a 
more useful way to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of empathy without losing each 
research field’s specificity and without provid-
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